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THE SUPREME COURT AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
By EDWIN BORCHARD*
I.
SoME OF the social-political theories which influenced the framers of
the Constitution were derived from Locke, Hume, Harrington, Coke and
Blackstone. These men were less concerned with forms of government
•than with the relation between society as a whole and its individual mem-
bers. They were sure that the individual possessed certain indefeasible,
primordial rights and that government was designed to protect these rights
against encroachment by the state or by classes within it. Perhaps the
most important of these private rights was that of property, associated
by Locke with liberty and often identified with it.' Thus, the effort of
the British Parliament to levy distasteful taxes and impose commercial
restrictions was pictured in America as a challenge to fundamental theories
of government.
But essentially the revolution was not economic in character. The
American leaders were quite satisfied with the economic order, but were
disturbed by the British threat to what they considered vested rights. In
the beginning they were as distrustful of the populace as they were of
the distant government. Their revolutionary philosophy developed slowly.
It is well known that Fianklin and Hamilton were not averse to a lim-
ited monarchy. But when the break with England became irrevocable
in 1775, and it proved necessary to arouse the people actively to vindicate
their sense of grievance, the virtues of democracy were extolled and
homage paid to the common man as the source of authority. The "natural
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also be found references to Hume and other philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, whose ideas were later employed to defend what the revolutionary Fathers
undertook to accomplish.
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rights" were now extended to him, with Patrick Henry and Thomas
Paine the major exponents of the theory. Jefferson recorded the aspira-
tion in classic documents. But when the war was over the more con-
servative note reappeared and the "imprudence of democracy", especially
in its disrespect for property, again troubled the framers of the Consti-
tution. While they talked about universal suffrage, in fact they left the
qualification of the voters to the States, where the ownership of property
was still a condition of the franchise.
The framers in 1787, combining a mercantilist policy of State pro-
motion of commercial interests with a modified laissez faire economy,
were primarily concerned with the distribution of governmental powers
to balance the influence of small against large States and to define the
jurisdiction of the federal government. While the theory of checks and
balances had been developed by continental political theorists and much
had been learned from the defective Articles of Confederation and from
State constitutions, the framers had no real precedents for the actual
division of governmental powers. They were able to convince the rati-
fiers that their plan was workable, and since then the world has stood
in admiration of the highly original architects of a federal system that
has withstood the ravages of war and economic disaster. For while
political and social changes have occurred and the suffrage has been
extended to those whose "imprudence" Hamilton feared, the framework
still stands, although the federal jurisdiction has been expanded much
beyond the original conception. Possibly these alterations would not have
been accepted but for their benevolent ratification by the judges of the
Supreme Court.
The liberalism which upheld private freedom from governmental
restraint has in late years suffered a schism between two schools whose
struggle for dominance threatens liberalism itself. During the broad
laissez faire economy of the 19th century, the division was not always
noticeable. The civil liberty of the private individual and the freedom
of the entrepreneur or businessman were hardly distinguished. They
were both protected by constitutional guaranties. When liberty and prop-
erty were twice mentioned in juxtaposition in the same sentence of the
Constitution, their different connotations were hardly perceived. Prop-
erty and accumulations, with rather unanimous support, enlisted the aid
of several constitutional clauses and extra-constitutional "principles",
focused on the doctrine of vested rights, to prevent or limit governmental
restraints.
The schism between the schools appeared with the improvement in the
machine, the growth of large-scale industry and the increase in population
toward the end of the 19th century. John Austin, Herbert Spencer and
William Sumner extolled the virtues of rugged individualism and the
rigors of unhampered competition, and challenged as a return to Toryism
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much of the increasing factory or social legislation and governmental
regulation. Thus, Justice Peckham and his colleagues in the Lochner case,
Justice Sutherland and his colleagues in the Adkins minimum wage
case, and the American Liberty League in 1935 had behind them his-
torical tradition and a political philosophy which they could with a certain
sincerity, misapplied to be sure, identify with Lockian liberalism.
What this school of thought too lightly overlooked was the change in
the social status of private enterprise as well as the contribution made
to liberalism by the humanitarians, who were more interested in the
liberty of the common man than in that of the businessman. The prag-
matism of the humanitarians led them to question the social use that the
laissez faire entrepreneurs were making of their asserted freedom from
governmental restraint. They found that the liberty of the factory owner
worked out too often in the oppression of the laborer. The humanitarians
therefore ranged themselves on the sides of governmental regulation of
industry and of labor union organization, while insisting upon the per-
sonal privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights against both govern-
ment and industry. They were willing to abandon the theology of natural
or inalienable rights, and while openly admitting, to the disgust of men
like Herbert Spencer, that both "liberty" and "property" were creatures
of the state and law and subject to public control, they nevertheless in-
sisted on the State's observing a broad interpretation of the constitutional
privileges of the common man.
Jeremy Bentham was among their leaders in England, and Henry
Carter Adams among their leaders in the United States. Successful
politicians have known how to exploit universal suffrage to produce vic-
tories for this view of liberalism. Whether they were always sincere or
whether they always tempered sentiment with wisdom is a debatable
question. The danger is that in its devotion to governmental regulation
the humane school may -unwittingly prove willing to support some form
of state collectivism or authoritarianism, which might easily lead to the
death of that flexibility and open-mindedness, that appreciation of balance
and compromise which we associate with liberalism, and hence to the pass-
ing of democracy itself. H. G. Wells, noting the trend, has remarked that
the humanitarian liberals lost their great opportunity when they shied
away from the mild reforms of the socialists of the late 19th century
and thus exposed society to the tempests of the class conflict. A funda-
mental cleavage in ideologies would make the democratic process itself
impossible.
The Constitution was expected to express the common bases of general
agreement, around which the minor differences of public and party policy
might play. It has proved, by the accommodating flexibility of a rela-
tively sensitive Supreme Court, adequate to meet so profound a transi-
tion as that from laissez faire to a publicly controlled economy. Only
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once did the cleavages prove too serious to accept judicial decision or
compromise, and even then violence might not have come had moral
crusaders not injected self-righteousness into the issue. It would be a
pity if strongly-held views of economic polity-which always implies a
vast element of conjecture, hope and undisciplined emotion, with the
least experienced the most certain of their panaceas--should convert a
guess concerning methods of achieving the more abundant life into so
fundamental an issue as to defy constitutional adjustment.
II.
In the long evolution of social policy from 1787 to the present, the
Supreme Court has necessarily played a vital part. Discussion will not
soon end as to whether the Court usurped authority in assuming the
function of judicial review and ostensibly final interpreter of the Consti-
tution. But that its position has met with popular acquiescence and gen-
eral approval, the common stand of the defenders of business liberty and
civil liberties against the 1937 attempt to weaken the Supreme Court
would indicate. Doubtless the Court has on occasion failed to reflect
popular conceptions, but these occasions have been infrequent and before
long, as in the cases of the Eleventh and Sixteenth Amendments, the
Court was either overruled in the constitutional way or, as in the case
of the Wagner Act decisions,2 the Court found it possible to interpret
the broad words of the Constitution so as to give effect to the prevailing
demand.
It is trite to remark that but for the capacity to adjust the construc-
tion and application of such terms as "liberty", "due process", "inter-
state commerce", "obligation of contract" to new conditions and new
facts, the Constitution would long since have had to be rewritten. Its
very virtue lies in this adjustability. Question may he raised as to whether
the Supreme Court rather than some other agency should have been the
official interpreter, but it can probably be affirmed that no other agency
would have proved so satisfactory or would have preserved so effectively
that balance between stability and change which every living organism
exhibits. As Mr. Justice Cardozo remarked in his Storrs Lectures de-
livered at the Yale Law School in 1921, "liberty" is not defined and does
not mean "the same thing for successive generations". This must neces-
sarily be so, because the changing political conceptions of the relationship
between private freedom and public restraint determine the meaning at
any given time to be assigned to such abstractions as "liberty" and even
"property". Locke's view of property as the product of one's personal
labor has greatly altered with the coming of the industrial system and
2. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1
(1937) and following cases in that volume.
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finance capitalism. Social requirements necessarily curtail individual
freedom, and the Court has a delicate function to perform in super% ibing
the proper balance between them, involving, as the issue does, political,
economic, and social considerations. The Court's judgment is expressed
in its ad hoc definition of such terms as "liberty" or "property", on the
one hand and "due process", the correlative, on the other.
Criticisms of the Court are centered not on the fact of flexibility of
construction and interpretation, which is inescapable and indeed desir-
able, but on the question whether the Court correctly reflects the pre-
vailing mores and whether, in setting aside legislation of a social or
economic character, it has failed to attribute adequate weight to the politi-
cal opinion of social relationships expressed by the legislature and has
unwisely undertaken to substitute its own political views of social policy.
When the Court maintains the "liberty" of the individual to accept as
low wages or as long hours as he "chooses", the humane liberals rise in
their wrath at the perversion. Considering the scope of the power, de-
rived from the broad terms of the Fourteenth Amendment and thence
transferred to the Fifth, and considering the fact that the Court under-
took, with public acquiescence, to "rewrite" the Fourteenth Amendment,3
of whose original purpose practically nothing is left, the Court's per-
formance over the long period of 150 years must be rated exceptionally
high.
But power practically always invites abuses, and it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court has been tempted. Much of the criticism arose
during the years 1922 to 1935, when a conservative majority stood rigidly
on its own views of economic policy to defeat price and other forms of
business regulation, invoking the "due process" clause as allegedly in-
exorable authority. When the New Deal came along the members of
this majority proved unusually adamant, and unfortunately relied upon
their supposed impregnability to frustrate social experiments which a
wiser use of their great powers would have sustained. The result, as
had happened before, was to invite attack upon their lack of self-restraint,
culminating in a formidable Presidential assault upon the integrity and
independence of the Court itself. While the method was unfortunate,
the lesson was not in vain. We may now see less dissipation of the ex-
ceptionally valuable power of judicial review either on such minor and
debatable subjects as price and wage regulation or on such equally econ-
omic or political questions as were involved in the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, the NRA and similar large-scale social experiments. In neither
of these extreme cases is it wise for the Court to interfere with the legis-
3. Justice Field, arch-defender of private initiative, thought it an "extra'rdinary
usurpation" for the Court to supervise police power legislation. Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U. S. 27, 30 (1885). He admitted that "special burdens are often necessary for general
benefits!'
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lature, certainly on social or "due process" grounds. For these experi-
ments the political branches must assume responsibility, and economic
"laws" will usually dictate the verdict. The power ought mainly to be
used in the intermediate ground where the individual or single corpora-
tion seeks protection against improper discrimination, oppression or
arbitrariness. A restraint in the use of the power will be likely to insure
its longevity.
The charge that the United States is a "government of judges" is
not necessarily derogatory. The restraint exerted by the courts on a
volatile and gullible population, over-confident in the faith that legisla-
tion can cure individual and social ills, has saved many a mistake. And
far from being ashamed of the device, it is a mark of social advancement
to have developed a popular willingness to bow, even grudgingly, to the
decrees of Nine Old Men. No error of theirs is necessarily fatal to the
community, as have on occasion been the errors of the Legislature and
the Executive. American history exemplifies the fact that the community
has ways of correcting judicial errors, if the Court's own corrective
process is too slow. We know also that the Court for the most part has
no occasion to pass upon many of the violations of civil liberties, which
rest in the hands of local communities and do not reach the courts. Respect
for these constitutional guaranties is a matter of education and com-
munity feeling. And when the Court is accused of "nullifying" the
Fifteenth Amendment, or failing to provide Negro equality under the
Fourteenth in the South, it must be remembered that even a Constitu-
tion cannot break down the entrenched mores, and that the Court probably
has done as much as it practically can to deal with local prejudice. Again,
the Court has in general sought to avoid passing on the constitutionality
of legislation, finding help in such devices as an excessively narrow con-
ception of justiciability, the possibility of deciding the case on other
grounds and holding tightly the procedural reins upon litigation. Al-
though the Court has at times unwisely extended its power to invalidate
legislation, it seems to be a fact that in at least 85% of the cases the
legislation is sustained.' On balance, therefore, there seems no justifi-
cation for breaking down or materially, altering an institution which
uniquely supplies that element essential to all governments and otherwise
peculiarly lacking in the United States-stability and continuity.
This is not the place to enter into an historical examination of that
remarkable phenomenon by which an individual or a group of individuals
can challenge before a body of judges the validity of an Act of Govern-
ment, of which those judges are a part. Perhaps the custom which
permits this challenge to take place daily, almost unnoticed, is a symbol
of the advance which the reign of law has achieved. But we have had
4. Cf. statistics in 2 WARREN, SuPr-.E COURT III UNITOE SrA'rvs HIsToRy (1928)
741; Chief justice Hughes in 16 A.B.A.J. 626, 629 (1930).
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occasion to learn in the last twenty years that no human in.titution is
beyond destruction and that the hard-won victories of reason uver force
are especially vulnerable. Let us not, then, be unduly intoltrant of the
Umpire, who, in time of stress and in time of tranquility, has had to
hold in balance both the federal system and the respective claims of the
individual and the community.
In that fluctuating struggle between individual and group for the
recognition of their claims, we can read the social history of the country.
As we know, the makers of the Constitution were jealous both of popular
majorities and of governmental control. The times in which they lived
and the Lockian philosophy in which they were nurtured made that seem
natural. The Civil War, while centralizing goverrnental power, as does
every war, also left in its -wake renewed pledges to individual liberty
and property, which were now placed under federal protection. And
while the Slaughter-House case majority was unwilling to enlarge federal
legislative or judicial power by reading a new content into the "privileges
and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Field's view that
the individual was now protected by the federal Government against
the legislation of his own State finally won out through a gradual if
extraordinary inflation of the innocent procedural phrase "due process
of law". And this suited the Rugged Individualism of the Gay Nineties.
when business expanded with the country. If thereby property values
were stabilized and guaranteed against serious governmental impairment
through the legerdemain of equating "due process" with "reasonable"
laws and "just compensation",' of transferring from the legislature to
the judiciary the control over rates,' of converting "personal liberty" into
"freedom of contract" and "contract" into "property", 7 of extending the
5. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307 (1886); Chicago, lfilwaukee & St.
Paul v. Minnesota, 134 U. S..418 (1890).
6. Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894).
7. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897). It is unnecessary to invoke the some-
what discredited "conspiracy theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, to justify the Court's
extension of the protection of property to corporations. Cf. Graham, The Conspiracy
Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment (1938) 47 YAix L. J. 371. Even if Roscoe Conk-
ling misled the Court as to the contents of the Journal of the Congressional Committee.
there is no conclusive evidence that his argument in the San Mateo case ,as the oper-
ative fact persuading the Court. Indeed, it does not matter whether the draftsmen had
corporations in mind or not. We know that Bingham, the principal draftsman of the
Amendment, thought that he had protected all persons, black and white, in the enjoyment
of fundamental rights under the "privileges and immunities" clause; that he knew that "due
process" had before 1866 been used in a substantive sense to protect property. The Su-
preme Court invoked only normal powers of interpretation in including corporations with-
in the term "persons." It would have been awkward to protect individual but not cor-
porate property against confiscation. Many clauses have been given an expansive inter-
pretation which the draftsmen had not thought of. This does not impeach the propriety
of the interpretation. It is not possible for the writer to agree with Justice Black's sen-
sational attempt in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 58 Sup. Ct. 436 (1933)
to turn hack the dock.
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immunities designed for the property-less Negro to the vast assets of
that corporate "person" known as the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany,8 it must be remembered that no great contemporaneous public
protest was made. The record, with minor exceptions,' does not disclose
any vociferous tumult or even deprecating smiles when the New York
Court of Appeals in 1885 held invalid a law prohibiting the manufacture
of cigars in the tenement houses of New York and Brooklyn, embroidered
with the following Individualist Manifesto:
"Such legislation may invade one class of rights to-day and another
to-morrow, and if it can be sanctioned under the Constitution, while
far removed in time we will not be far away in practical statesman-
ship from those ages when governmental prefects supervised the
building of houses, the rearing of cattle, the sowing of seed, and the
reaping of grain, and governmental ordinances regulated the move-
nients and labor of artisans, the rate of wages, the price of food, the
diet and clothing of the people, and a large range of other affairs
long since in all civilized lands regarded as outside of governmental
functions." 10
When, then, Justice Peckham in 1905 broke the camel's back with his
interesting platitudes in Lochner v. New York," holding invalid as an
interference with the freedom of contract a legislative limitation of ten
hours daily labor in bakeshops, he cannot be said to have been out of
the tradition of the founding fathers. Even when, a generation later,
the United States Supreme Court held invalid a state law limiting the
excess price that scalpers could charge on theater tickets;12 or a law
providing for fixing wages and other terms of employment in labor
disputes in certain essential industries, such as public utilities, food, fuel
and clothing ;13 or limiting the fees to be charged by employment agen-
cies ;14 or regulating the price of gasoline ;1 or making the sale of ice in
Oklahoma a public utility,18 the majority probably believed that they
8. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U. S. 394 (1886).
9. One notable exception was Henry Carter Adams' monograph, Relation of the
State to Industrial Action, Publications of the American Economic Ass'n, I, No. 6, 1887.
10. In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 (1885).
11. 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
12. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 430 (1927) (by Sutherland, J.).
13. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (by
Taft, C. J.).
14. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928) (by Sutherland, J.). But see O'Gor-
man & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931) (sustaining a limi-
tation on commissions of insurance brokers, by Brandeis, J.; dissenting opinion of Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, Jj., on ground that the public had no
interest in these agency contracts).
15. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929) (by Sutherland, J.).
16. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (by Suthirland, J.; dis-
senting opinion by Brandeis and Stone, JJ.). But the Court, by Sutherland, J., had held
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constituted the bulwark of old-fashioned liberalism. When, however, in
1934 in the Nebbia case,' 7 it was discovered that there was no dosed
category of "business affected with a public interest" and that New York
might through a Board fix the selling price of milk, laissez faire suffered
a rude shock. To some, liberalism had changed its face. No longer the
protector of the individual against social control, it had come to recog-
nize that not only the interests of the community but perhaps the best
protection for the individual lay in a reasonable limitation on the entre-
preneur. All that had happened was that the humane liberals had pre-
vailed over the fundamentalists-once the Loddan "free enterprise"
liberals, now the conservatives.
The reaction from Lochner v. New York gradually led to a new group-
ing of public opinion which sustained as necessary to the general welfare
a certain amount, perhaps an ever greater degree, of state control. This
movement, however deflected on occasion by decisions limiting the state's
power to protect the social welfare by curtailing individual liberty,10
reached its culmination in a notable opinion of Chief Justice Hughes,
speaking in 1934 for a bare majority of the Court, holding valid as not
impairing the obligation of contract the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
law extending the debtor's time for the redemption of the mortgage and
limiting the rights of the mortgage creditor.'0 The Chief Justice gave
the reasons why more social organization was now necessary than here-
tofore and why, in his opinion, individual opportunity vas thereby safe-
guarded rather than weakened. He said:
"It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has
been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of
finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights
and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of
the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing density of
population, the interrelation of the activities of our people and the
complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to an in-
cotton ginning to be a "business affected with a public interest" Frost v. Corporation
Commission, 278 U. S. 515 (1929).
17. Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) (by Rob.rts, J.; dissent-
ing opinion by McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler).
18. Cf. Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission. 293 U. S. 1 (1935), in vhich
Sutherland, J., defended the privilege of a registrant with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to withdraw his application upon discovery of his misrepresentation. If
this were denied, he said, the "cardinal precepts of personal liberty are violated;" the
"Government ceases to be one of law and becoms an autocracy." Cardozo, J.. dissenting,
considers it a defense of business immorality in the name of personal liberty. Yet some-
times even criminals are protected in their civil liberties for public reasons. Cf. Nar-
done v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
19. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 393 (1934) (dis-
senting opinion by Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler, JJ.).
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creased use of the organization of society in order to protect the
very bases of individual opportunity."20
A close case, which divided the Court last year, brings out the differ-
ence in attitude. Senn, a tile layer, worked for himself with an occa-
sional helper or two. Not having been an apprentice, as the Tile Layers
Union required, he could not be a member of the union; the union agree-
ment also provided that only union members could install materials, and
for that reason Senn declined to sign it. The union thereupon picketed
Sen, as permitted by the Wisconsin labor code, as "unfair", and com-
bined to prevent his getting jobs, on the justificatibn that his non-union
competition injured the union. The majority, speaking through Brandeis,
J., held that the methods adopted by the union were not unlawful under
the labor code, and that the Wisconsin law which thus assisted union
labor was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2' The minority,
speaking through Mr. Justice Butler,2 2 shocked at the statutory power
thus indirectly to keep Senn from working as a tile-layer, invoked dram-
atically the inalienable privilege of the individual to engage in the common
occupations of life, and the disability of the State to interfere with it.
Butler quotes from Meyer v. Nebraska, prohibiting the State from inter-
fering with instruction in a foreign language in a private school, as fol-
lows:
"While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. With-
out doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."1
23
and from the somewhat notorious Coppage v. Kansas:
"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private
property-partaking of the nature of each-is the right to make
contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such con-
tracts is that of personal employment by which labor and other ser-
vices are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this
20. Id. at 442.
21. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
22. Id. at 483.
23. 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) (by McReynolds, J.). These principles were enunciat-
ed by Bradley, J., in Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 762 (1884)
and first announced for a unanimous court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
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right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a sub-
stantial impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional
sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist,
to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no
other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for
money." 24
After quoting similar generalizations, Justice Butler for himself and
three colleagues expresses his conviction that the attempt to keep Senn
out of a job was an unlawful purpose and that a lawv which permits it
must be invalid. While the majority were probably familiar with the
decisions and opinions quoted, they must have perceived a higher social
interest in facilitating the unionization of all labor than the interest of
Senn, personally. What is the higher interest in these matters is often
a debatable question. Some of the considerations on which the Court
seems to determine that question and the steps by which it achieved its
position as umpire will now be examined.
III.
The processes and devices by which the courts arrogated to themselves
the function of arbiter of social and economic policy exemplify the growth
of constitutional law. We know that even before 1800 the courts read
into the Constitution the so-called "inalienable" rights of the individual
and constituted themselves the censors of much state legislation. All dur-
ing the 19th century the process continued. They had to find appropriate
phrases within which to clothe this extraordinary power and did so by
invoking the "social compact", "natural justice", "law of nature", "com-
mon right", fundamental "spirit of the Constitution".' Protest against
this use of extra-judicial or unwritten criteria for exercising the veto
power resulted in a successful effort to find terms within the written
Constitution which would serve the same purpose, so that before the
Fourteenth Amendment, the impairment of the obligation of contracts
clause, and in the states "law of the land" were often invoked as limita-
tions on legislative interference with rights in property and other personal
privileges.
24. 236 U. S. 1, 14 (1915). Cf. Hughes, C. J., in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U. S. 379,391 (1937) : "But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization vhich
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals
and welfare of the people."
25. Cf. Chase, J., in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S. 1798) ; Story, J., in Terrett
v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 (U. S. 1815) ("standing upon the principles of international jus-
tice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and letter of
the constitution"). Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment (1930) 18 CAuF. L REv. 583; Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Consttutional Law (1928) 42 HAIv. L. Rrv. 149; Grant, The
Natural Law Background of Due Process (1931) 31 CoL. - RLv. 56.
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This function of enabling judges by the process of interpretation to
write their own Constitutional limitations upon legislative power was ac-
companied by the view that the legislative power of the states was a limited
power, a grant of specific powers; and although that view conflicts with
theory, in fact the grant of powers to the legislature has been construed
as a limitation. Had Chase, J., in Calder v. Bull, perhaps with justifiable
prescience, not taken the heart out of the ex post facto clause by limiting
it to criminal legislation, we should have seen an even wider judicial
control over the legislature in the invalidation of "retroactive" legisla-
tion diminishing vested rights.
Even before the due process clause was timidly invoked in New York,20
the theory that the judges' view of public policy could define both the
unwritten and the written limitations on legislative power was entrenched,
The belief that the due process clause related only to procedure doubtless
prevented its wider use, but in the Dred Scott case it found its way as a
substantive limitation into the United States Supreme Court." The func-
tion of judicial control was further aided by the court's ability to inter-
pret the other element in the equation, "property" and later "liberty". The
abstraction property was extended by several courts, even before the Four-
teenth Amendment, to include various types of intangible rights, fran-
chises, remedies, contracts, the privilege of engaging in trade, the right
to use property in certain ways. Even the term police power had come
into use,.with the courts the judges of the question -whether the invasion
of private property or liberty was adequately justified on public grounds.
If not, the courts had innumerable catchwords to draw upon to justify
the disallowance. The Fourteenth Amendment merely gave the federal
courts a specific power to assume a jurisdiction that they had already
exercised to a limited extent, provided the state legislation offended the
judges' innermost convictions. Those convictions still rule the process of
interpretation, but they have as we know experienced tfie same meta-
morphosis that in general public opinion has undergone, namely, from
skepticism to toleration of public control, with the special facts determin-
ing the balance of power in any given case.
But as we know, the potentialities of the "due process" clause after
1868 as a means of censoring state legislation, to which function even
Field expressed repugnance, were not at once recognized, because the
judicial power to protect private rights against encroachment was regarded
as adequately safeguarded by the "privileges and immunities" clause of
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Field, Bradley and Peck-
ham showed the way, for of Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-iouse
26. Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N. Y. 1843); Wynehamer v. State of New York,
13 N. Y. 378 (1856).
27. See Taney, C. J., in Drcd Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 450 (U. S. 1856).
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cases2 8 only that part has remained in practical effect which inferentially
-and in the Civil Rights cases expressly'---prohibits Congress from
legislating directly to impose on individuals the obligatiun of equal treat-
ment to the Negro and similar victims of discrimination.
Miller's view that the "privileges and immunities" covered only the
privileges of federal citizenship against state impairment, requiring as it
did an involved distinction between state and federal privileges and a
practical emasculation of the clause, resulted in obliging other judges of
the Court to read all kinds of limitations into the "due process" clause
of the Amendment. It is doubtful whether Miller's narrow and indeed
nullifying construction of the "privileges and immunities" clause repre-
sented good statesmanship. His view was actuated by the fear, fortified
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, that Congress would, under the fifth
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, assume to legislate all the civil
rights of the individual throughout the states and thus transfer to the
federal government, as others have remarked, the entire police power.
But this was not a necessary consequeice of giving the "privileges and
immunities" clause the meaning originally intended by its draftsmen,
namely, to safeguard against state impairment the bill of rights of the
first eight Amendments. It would still have been possible to limit the
scope of the fifth section3" to the bounds of corrective or penalty legis-
lation upon the states which violated the injunctions of the "privileges
and immunities" and due process and equal protection clauses, as was
later held in the Civil Rights cases.31 Although Miller's distinction between
state and federal citizenship has been affirmed by the Court in later deci-
sions, its significance is breaking down through the broad interpretation
now given to the word "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment and
through the doubts cast upon its impregnability by Colgate v. Harvey,32
in which it was held to be a privilege of a citizen of the United States
not to be taxed by Verniont at a higher rate for investing money outside
than inside the state. There would be far greater advantage in restoring
the original meaning of the "privileges and immunities" clause and by
the process of inclusion and exclusion letting the country know what are
now federal privileges, than in forcing the court to draw upon the fathom-
less depths of the "due process" clause to give effect to their personal
convictions of economic and social propriety.
The process of constitutional evolution has thus brought it about that
the main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment (equal prntection for
28. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36 (U. S. 1873).
29. 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
30. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this Article."
31. Supra, note 29.
32. 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
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the Negro) has been largely frustrated, whereas a function then not
thought of, the protection of private property against the police power,
has become perhaps the most striking feature of the Amendment. And
the protector is the Supreme Court itself. In a series of pronouncements
commencing with the dissenting or concurring opinions of Field and
Bradley in the Slaughter-House, Bartemeyer, Mutnn and Crescent City
cases3a and reaching unanimous approval with Peckham's opinion in the
Allgeyer case, 4 that Court made itself the judge of the issue whether
legislation restricting private rights was or was not an undue encroach-
ment. The question will remain whether this expansion of judicial power
has done the country more harm than good. For it must be remembered
that, aside from the stabilization of property values, the extraordinary
enlargement of the concept "liberty" first announced in the Allgeyer case,
was later employed-with widespread approval-to enable the Supreme
Court to pass upon state violations of civil liberties, such as the freedom
of speech, press and assembly..
We are informed by learned judges that the obligation to declare legis-
lation unconstitutional is inexorable. The Constitution necessarily must
prevail. Thus, we are told, it was discovered by the simple process of
laying the Constitution beside the statute that minimum wage require-
ments for women 3, were unconstitutional and that agriculture was a local
industry, hence incapable of federal subsidy by processing taxes in return
for agreed restriction on production. 6 Yet we have also been told that
statutes and the Constitution mean what the judges say they mean.
31
And this must be so; for we can trace in the fifty-year period between
1886 and the present day the steady expansion of judicial review and
the frequent substitution of the Court's own views of social policy for
those of the legislature. If the majority of the Court approves the law
and the policy it is constitutional; if it does not, it is unconstitutional,
The Lochner case,38 in 1905 marks the highpoint of what is now called
the conservative view. With the ascendant influence of Holmes and
Pitney, the Court later accepted on the whole the Progressive view of
social policy and sustained labor legislation, for the protection of women
and, in the Bunting case, 9 even of men, and after 1914, a wide range
33. See dissents in Slaughter-House cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 (U. S. 1873) ; dissent in
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 136 (1877) (by Field and Strong); concurring opinions
of Field and Bradley in Barteneyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129 (U. S. 1873) and in Butehers
Union v. Crescent City Co., supra note 23. People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1 (1889), fol-
lowing the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, and dissents by Peckharn and Gray.
34. 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
35. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 544 (1923).
36. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 62 (1936).
37. Cf. IHTUGFzS, THE SuPMIE C6URT O 'a UNITED STATES (1928) 41, 230.
38. 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
39. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917).
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of workmen's compensation legislation and state socialization.40 With
the War came a climate of reaction, evidenced not only in free speech
cases but in other cases as well.41 The post-war fear of radicalism then
induced in certain judges, occasionally making a majority, a renewed
opposition to social control. During the 1920's price-fixing and other
police power measures were not infrequently invalidated.' Since the
depression, a sounder view of the necessity of broadening the scope of
legislative discretion in regulating the community's economic and social
relations has with certain exceptions, achieved support, until even the
notorious minimum wage policy, over the grieved protest of Justice
Sutherland and his conservative colleagues, has after fifteen years been
found to be constitutional.43 These undulations in judicial view not only
reveal the true source of constitutional authority and the utility of keeping
it abreast of the-times, but also the importance of judicial self-restraint
in employing the power to pass upon social questions.
The road by which the Supreme Court achieved judicial supremacy
in the social field has been pointed out by several writers." After the
Munn case, the Court ultimately accepted as law the reiterated dissents.
of Field and Bradley, a feat accomplished through the mediation largely
of Justice Peckham, who brought with him from the New York Court
of Appeals certain doctrines there nurtured as fundamental truths. The
Court of Appeals in the, Jacobs case, already referred to, assumed that
it, rather than the legislature, was the judge of the question whether the
police power was properly used, i.e., whether the evil to be cured or the
object to be achieved was within the scope of the police power and whether
the method employed was "convenient" or "appropriate" to the end in
view. What license the courts had to undertake that function no one
explained, and as already observed, in a period of rampant individualism,
the view was not unwelcome to those with economic stakes in the com-
munity. Even Justice Miller, who in the Slaughter-House cases had re-
jected the notion that the Supreme Court could be made the censor of all
state legislation, remarked in Loan Association v. Topeka,," an eight to
one decision, that "it must be conceded that there are . . . rights in
every free Government beyQnd the control of the State." The limitations
on the power of the State, thought Miller, grew "out of the essential
40. Cf. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920).
41. CI. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1 (1926).
42. Compare Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921), where a rent restriction law in
an emergency was sustained, with Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543
(1924), where it was not sustained, because the emergency was deemed to have passed.
43. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
44. See BounIN, GovFx1ENT' BY JUDICIARY (1932, 2 v.); Charles Varren, The New
"Liberty" under the Fourteenth Anendnent (1926) 39 HAM. L. Rnv. 431, 437; Corwin,
The Fourteenth Amendment (1909) 7 Mica. L. Rzv. 643.
45. 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874).
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nature of all free governments, implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist . . ."'I A government
which recognized no such rights, he said, was a "despotism". Justice
Clifford, the lone dissenter, took more earnestly the denial that the Court
had any but expressly declared supervisory power over the legislature,
for, he said, the "courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people
of the State, save where those rights are secured by some constitutional
provision which comes within judicial cognizance . . ." otherwise the
courts would become sovereign and "convert the government into a
judicial despotism."
' 41
Thus the two contrasting views of judicial power were definitely estab-
lished. Which view prevailed we now know; but the victors have not
in recent years led a happy life. Always their citadel has been under
attack, recently to the point of threatening the integrity of the Court.
The power nevertheless developed naturally, because it was merely an
extension of already conceded functions. Only when the police power
began to place restrictions on the use of private property and on the exer-
cise of individual activity did the supervisory function of the Court
expand, and by that time its friends and the climate of opinion had con-
spired to permit its relatively unhampered development. Indeed some of
the judges today regard the power as a "vested right" and resent as
nearly preposterous the suggestion that it should be exercised with
restraint.'8 These objecting judges believe that they expound the Con-
stitution, not their own views. They would deny the validity of the
opinion expressed nearly sixty years ago by Justice Holmes in his book
on the Common Law that every legal principle is the expression of the
judges' public policy, a result of "instinctive preferences and inarticulate
convictions." If this is true of the common law, how much more true
is it of governmental doctrine.
We have alluded to the devices employed by the courts to arrogate
to themselves this immense power of finally passing on social legisla-
tion. This was done in the Jacobs case4" by questioning the integrity of
the legislative use of the police power. On the assumption that the police
power had only a limited scope, the court§ would argue that the statute
merely pretended to be a police power measure, that in fact it had no
police power purpose, or that if ostensibly passed for such a purpose,
e.g., health, that the means employed had no relation to that end or were
not calculated to promote it. This line of reasoning, charging the legis-
lature with disingenuousness or ineptitude, throttled much legislation
46. Id., at 663.
47. Id., at 668-669.
48. Cf. Justice Sutherland's protest of this view in NVest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U. S. 379 (1937).
49. 98 N. Y. 98 (1885).
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which today is accepted as indispensable. The reasoning, or rather the
major premise which dictated the result, served for a time to undo statutes
for the limitation of hours, workmen's compensation, union labor pro-
tection, prohibition of child labor, and minimum wages."0 In People v.
Budd,51 the majority of the New York court believed public opinion was
a sufficient restraint upon excessive legislative invasions of private liberty
or property, but the dissenters, led by Peckham, thought that state control
of grain elevators' charges was a reversion to the paternalistic govern-
ment of the 17th or 18th century. The "liberty" which the majority
undertook to protect against state invasion in the Allgeyer case was
"deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoy-
ment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways;
to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and es-
sential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes
above mentioned." 12
It seems churlish to question this benevolent language; and yet in sub-
sequent years restraints upon the liberties mentioned have had to be
exerted and have been sustained. The NRA even contemplated govern-
mental licenses to enter overfilled occupations, and if necessary, prohibiting
entrance. The freedom of contract has been seriously limited."3 Indeed,
practically the same conservative court which pronounced the Loclner
decision had a few years earlier recognized that inequality in bargaining
power constituted a justification for the state's limitation of hours of
labor in dangerous occupations ;5 soon thereafter came a recognition that
differences in physical capacity between men and women justified a differ-
entiation in working conditions ;55 that the state had an interest in the
health of all its workers, and could prevent them from being employed
50. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry., 201
N. Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) ;
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918).
51. 117 N. Y. 1 (1889).
52. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589 (1897). CI. the language of the Court
which struck down the District of Columbia minimum wage law in 1922: "To sustain the
individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution, (to work for any low
wage) is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it; for surely the good of
society as a whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary
restraint of the liberties of its constituent members." 261 U. S. 525, 561.
53. Cf. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
54. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898). Cf. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539
(1909); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
55. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
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over ten hours a day in a manufacturing establishment, 5 until now not
only wage and hour statutes but many other provisions for the protection
of labor are deemed valid. 7 The vaunted liberty of contract has suffered
many restraints, not because liberty is no longer held in esteem but be-
cause its exposure to abuse resulted in constraint of the weaker and
because a wider general liberty is often better achieved by restriction or
regulation of what had become license. Now we find in ever. greater
degree the interstate commerce and the taxing powers employed for police
power purposes. s So liberal to labor legislation had the Supreme Court
become after 1908, as contrasted with the restrictive views of the state
courts, that labor itself in 1913 demanded an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court from state decisions holding state legislation unconstitu-
tional on federal grounds.59
The Court's power to do what it wishes and to carry into the decision
an inarticulate major premise is aided or accompanied by certain con-
trivances. One of these is to begin from an alleged presumption of con-
stitutionality. If the statute is sustained, the obeisance to the legislature
is usually brief.60 The more questionable the propriety of the decapitation
about to be committed the more fervent the attendant profession of devo-
tion to and respect for the legislative will. Thus, the Adkins minimum
wage opinion begins with the familiar ritual: "The judicial duty of passing
upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress is one of great gravity
and delicacy. The statute here in question has successfully borne the
scrutiny of the legislative branch of the Government which, by enacting
it, has affirmed its validity; and that determination must be given great
weight." No case more fully justified genuine adherence to this view.
But when the court has decided on annihilation of the statute, it is sur-
prising how easily "clear and indubitable demonstration" can overcome
the presumption of validity.'
The actuating postulates of the Court may be quite tenacious, however,
and it is these postulates which usually decide the case. Where the Court
is willing to take judicial notice of the propriety of the restraint on private
rights, it will either rely on the legislative findings, or presume a con-
dition of fact justifying the regulation, or decline to accept evidence show-
56. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917).
57. Cf. The Social Security Act, sustained in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U. S. 548 (1937).
58. Cf. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, decided
March 28, 1938, 58 Sup. Ct. 656; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
59. Act of March 23, 1914, 38 STAT. 790, 28 U.S. C. § 344(b) (1934).
60. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931);
South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 519 (1938).
But cf. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 (1934).
61. 261 U. S. 525, 544 (1923).
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ing the inequitable operation of the statute in a particular case.0' On the
other hand, where the Court starts from the presumption that the legis-
lation, as in the Lochner case, is a "meddlesome interference with the
rights of the individual," or that "liberty is the rule and restraint the
exception," 63 it will probably disregard the legislative finding and demand
an exceptional preponderance of evidence of constitutional facts from the
supporter of the legislation." The greater the degree of prejudice or
preconception, the greater the burden to overcome it. Hence the growing
science of pleading constitutional facts and the Court Rule that when
constitutional facts are incapable of judicial notice the lower courts shall
make findings of fact. 3
In administrative proceedings the Court has reserved a supervisory
control of findings of fact, which has again enabled it to do what it wishes
to do. It is really bound by few precedents. Perhaps this flexibility is
desirable, but the rationalization for both adhering to and departing from
previous decisions is not always satisfying.
The Court's solicitude for private interests is evidenced in the control
exercised not only over the method of reaching administrative findings,
but over the findings themselves. Especially where rate-making and hence
"confiscation" is involved, the Court is disposed to review administrative
findings. Thus, in the recent St. Joseph Stockyards case, the Chief Justice
remarked:, "Legislative agencies . . . work in a field peculiarly exposed
to political demands . . . But to say that their findings of fact may be
made conclusive where constitutional rights of liberty and property are
involved . . . is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative
officials and seriously to impair the security inherent in our judicial
safeguards." c
And yet, even here a change is noticeable. A distinction is being recog-
nized between the different types of administrative agencies and hence
between the yarying need of judicial review. The more expert the admin-
istrative agency, to which of necessity an ever greater degree of control
over private right must be relegated, the less disposed are the courts to
62. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911) ; Rast v. Van
Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357, 370 (1916) ; Borden's Farm Products Co. v.
Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 (1934); cf. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1833);
Ex parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 80 Pac. 463 (1905).
63. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
64. Cf. Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 111 (1928) (no relation found between
stock ownership and public health in statute requiring drug stores to be owned by phar-
macists).
65. Equity Rule 70-1/2. See the valuable note in (1931) 49 HAnv. L. REV. 631. Cf.
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 44 Sup. Ct. 412 (1924) (the Court made its
own finding that tolerance for shrinkage in the statutory weight of loaves of bread was
inadequate). See also Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
66. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 52
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review their findings of fact. Even the reservation to the Supreme Court
of control of jurisdictional or "constitutional" facts"T is meeting with
growing opposition as an unnecessary obstruction of the administrative
process. The courts have probably burdened themselves unduly in review-
ing valuation for rate-making purposes, where they might well limit ju-
dicial control, especially of state commissions and courts, to the dispens-
ing of substantial justice. Such a case as McCart v. Indianapolis Water
Co.,8 representing a continuous shuttling from commission to courts
and back again without visible end, might well be cut off, as Justice
Black suggested, by a refusal to review that vast collection of fluctuating
hypotheses which Smyth v. "Ames69 dictated as factors in rate-making,
whenever the Court considers substantial justice to have been done to
the utility as well as to the consumer. The opportunity to review procedure
and to set aside findings that have no or inadequate support in the evidence
gives the Court full control over arbitrariness or gross injustice. Perhaps
Texas has found the answer, at least in part. To meet the argument that
a utility is entitled to an independent judicial judgment upon the facts
and the law, Texas provided that a state court jury would pass on the
evidencede novo, if desired, and the Supreme Court has considered that
this satisfied the requirement of due process, and, while not conclusive,
the finding is apparently entitled to greater weight than a commission
findingY°
Perhaps the principal way by which the Supreme Court has become
the final judge of social policies and brought upon itself the appellation
of "a third legislative body" is by disregarding the natural limitations
upon the judicial function. Years ago Holmes, and in more recent times
Brandeis, Stone and others, have admonished the judges of the Court
against undertaking to vote on legislation as if they were members of
the legislature. They have been urged not to read their own economic
predilections into the due process clause. Yet only a few of the judges
have apparently been able to make Holmes' distinction between the
attitude of a judge and that of a legislator. Only when the judge can
say that no reasonable body of men sitting in a legislature could have
thought that an evil existed or that the fnethod adopted was conducive
67. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920) (evidence
for public utility valuation) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) (place of injury
as affecting jurisdiction under Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349 (1936) (rates as fair return); cf. Oppenheimer,
The Supreme Court and Administrative Law (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 1.
68. 302 U. S. 419 (1938). Perhaps Railroad Commission v. Pacific G. & E. Co.
58 Sup. Ct. 334 (1938) indicates that valuation will no longer be subjected to supposedly
rigid tests. Cf. review of the cases in note, Judicial Control Over Methods of Valuation
in Public Utility Rate Cases (1938) 51 HARv. L. Rav. 885.
69. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
70. United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 58 Sup. Ct. 483 (1938).
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toward its eradication, or that the legislation is "utterly unreasonable
and extravagant" 71 is the Court justified-pretermitting the propriety
of the substantive conception of due process'-%--in refusing to uphold
it. On occasion the Court has avowed such a policy. It has said:
"The mere fact that a Court may differ with the legislature in its
views of public policy, or that judges may hold views inconsistent
with the propriety of the legislation in question, affords no ground
for judicial interference . . .
That is what Justice Stone doubtless meant by a sense of judicial self-
restraint.
IV.
What are the private rights which the Supreme Court has protected?
We can perhaps say that they have no established and permanent con-
tent, for they depend on that changing polity which necessarily affects
the views of the Court at any particular time. 4 The emasculation of the
"privileges and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment left
under precarious State protection most of the guaranties embodied in
the Bill of Rights, although it was doubtless the purpose of the framers
of that clause to place those guaranties under federal control. Limited
further by the narrow construction given to the legislative power of
Congress under the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
broad leeway to ]Rractical inequality which the "equal protection" clause
affords, Negro and other minorities can hardly find much satisfaction
in the enlargement of individual freedom and legal equality which the
-Amendment was supposed to assure.
Criminal jury trial and the writ of habeas corpus in the states, though
considered so fundamental as to be embodied in the text of the original
constitution, may now be cut down, if not indeed abolished. Religious
freedom, perhaps the freedom of assemblage, the suffrage within slight
71. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (1909).
72. Brandeis, J., admitted in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 373 (1937) that the
application of due process to substantive law was "settled." But for that view, many civil
liberties would be without federal protection.
73. Ibid. Cf. Hughes, C. J., in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379,
399 ("Legislative response to that conviction cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capri-
cious, and that is all we have to decide. Even if the wisdom of the policy bt regarded as
debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment.") The
question is "whether it is possible to say that the legislative choice is without rational
basis." South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 53 Sup. Ct. 510, 517
(1938).
74. Cf. The rent restriction cases, supra note 42. In Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127
U. S. 678 (1888), the Court tolerated legislative suppression of an industry. In liag-
nano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934), a unanimous court, by Sutherland, J., permitted
such a result by use of the taxing power.
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limitations, cultural rights, are hardly under federal protection. While
the expanded conception of "liberty" has brought under federal super-
vision certain state invasions of what are deemed indispensable or funda-
mental personal privileges,75 the great assaults have come from private
sources which the State is unwilling to control; and the Supreme Court
unfortunately seems to consider state inaction as not subject to the same
judicial sanctions as state action."6 Perhaps some day a broader view
of the protective function of the Fourteenth Amendment will be taken.
In time of stress, also, when the guaranties of the bill of rights are
most needed, they are likely to be tacitly suspended. The protection af-
forded by the avowals in Ex parte Milligan 7 were practically unavailable
during the Great War. In the hysteria about labor and revolutionary
trouble after the War, some of the most drastic statutory assaults on
freedom of speech and assembly escaped federal censure, under the ration-
alization that the changes in the social or political order contemplated
by radical groups could not be accomplished except "by force and vio-
lence". the "clear and present danger" that advocacy might ripen into
action, the jury test which the Court laid down in the Schenck case"8 has
been of little help in time of public excitement.79 Pacifism may be preached
only when there is no danger of war and most safely at luncheons of the
Foreign Policy Association.
But the Supreme Court has gone further in approving restrictions on
political expression. In the Gitlow case s8 a distributor of the Left Wing
75. This by no means includes all the privileges mentioned in the first eight amend-
ments. A good review of the dividing line between the privileges of fundamental import-
ance, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and those of secondary importance, not
so protected, will be found in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1938) (by Car-
dozo, J.).
76. The Supreme Court has not really passed on the question. Inferences in either
direction can be drawn. Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921) (injunction denied) ;
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) (failure to allow counsel). The view of Con-
gress is declared in the Civil Rights Act, to the effect that if the "constituted authorities"
of any state "shall be unable to protect or shall for any cause fail in or refuse protection
of the people in such rights, such facts shall be deemed a denial by such state of the equal
protection of the laws." The same principle is embraced in the federal anti-lynching
bill. See Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 199; (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 854. Logically, a
"denial" of equal protection is just as possible by inaction (negligence, failure to act)
as by action. International law holds the State responsible in both cases.
77. 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866). On this general subject, see Boudin, The Supreme Court
and Civil Rights, 1 SCIENCE AND SociETY (1937) (No. 3) 273; Fraenkel, The Supreme
Court and Civil Liberties, American Civil Liberties Union (1937) ; Donovan, An Inde-
pendent Supreme Court and the Protection of Minority Rights (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 254,
78. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
79. Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) (Abrams and others drew
sentences of twenty years for issuing pamphlets condemning American intervention
against Soviet Russia). See also Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) (pun-
ishment for publishing a pamphlet stating some of the factors which produced American
entry into the war). Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920).
80. 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
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Manifesto, representing a group of insignificant radicals, was convicted
under a New York criminal anarchy statute not because there was any
"dear and present danger" that anybody would be converted by his decla-
mation but because the State in its own protection could stop the advocacy
of doctrines which the Court construes as contemplating violence. Miss
Whitney was dealt with even more harshly. She merely associated with
those who were organizing the Communist Labor Party, which was said
to be advocating violent revolution."' That looks as if mere membership
in the Party might be held punishable, as it is in some states, although
the Supreme Court has not yet so held. Probably undue significance is
attached to the reversal of a criminal conviction of a communist in Oregon,
De Jonge, 2 on the ground that although he presided over a meeting of
communists, he was engaged in protesting illegal action of the police in
permitting a strike meeting to be broken up, and was not preaching com-
munism. Had he been, he might have been in the toils.83 Even Herndon,"
young Negro communist from Georgia, convicted under an old "insur-
rection" statute, finally escaped serving sentence because the evidence did
not show that he had distributed communistic literature or preached the
faith. It is to be welcomed that the "clear and present danger" test has
been revived in the Herndon case, i.e., in criminal syndicalism cases, as
against the "dangerous tendency" test of the Gitlow case.
When the Court finds a particular conviction too nauseating, it is likely
to discover in the record" some ground on which the conviction can be
reversed. So, the California statute prohibiting the display of the red
flag vras too much even for Justice Butler."8 In the dilemma which the
advocacy of radical doctrines has furnished, the Court is perhaps wise
just now in deciding each case on narrow grounds, however unsatisfactory
that may be. When the climate of opinion is hostile to industrial change
or to the Jeffersonian doctrine of frequent political change, it is well not
to ask for general commitments. The present Court is likely to establish
a reasonable balance between free political expression and the preservation
of the safety of the State. On the whole, therefore, one can reach his
own conclusions as to whether the freedom to utter unwelcome doctrine
has been safeguarded by the Supreme Court.
The freedom of the press, now also brought under the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment, has received support from the Court by
prohibiting both advance censorship of a scandal sheet and indirect
81. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927).
82. Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
83. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the fifth Circuit is reported to have held recently
that membership in the Communist Party was not a sufficient ground for deportation.
84. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
85. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
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methods of controlling editorial expression." But during the War drastic
restrictions by administrative order were sustained,"' so that while it
is still possible to criticize the Government in time of public tranquillity,
it is doubtful how far that privilege will be sustained in time of stress.
The Supreme Court has not considered itself justified in insuring the
administration of justice in the States. Even a "fair trial" has not been
deemed the court's special concern. But in recent years some relaxation
of their hesitancy to intervene is apparent, and when the procedure is
too outrageous, the Court has assumed jurisdiction. Thus, mob domina-
tion of the trial, a prosecutor's participation in perjury, the denial of
counsel, a forced confession, have been deemed violations of federal due
process." So when flagrant miscarriages of justice occur in state courts.
As time goes on, we are likely to find an ever greater disposition to impose
the principal guaranties of the bill of rights upon the states, if not under
the "privileges and immunities" clause, then under the due process and
equal protection clauses.8 9 To that end, a relaxation of the requirements
to become a "person within the jurisdiction" is noticeable.cY"
To that noble experiment, Prohibition, we owe much of our knowledge
concerning the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. With-
out reviewing the cases it may be said that the Court has placed severe
restrictions upon the methods by which evidence may be obtained and
thus has placed a pretty effective check on lawlessness by enforcing offi-
cers.9" While this has annoyed many judges, on the ground that the
immunity has been invoked by criminals and has hampered the enforce-
ment of the law, the Court has recently defended its rule,C in a case
prohibiting wiretapping as a means of securing evidence, by the view
that "Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders
should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods
86. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931)'; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U. S. 233 (1936) ; Lovell v. City of Grioin, Ga., 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938) (no broad license
permitted as condition of distributing handbills or religious tracts).
87. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 (1921).
88. In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915), mob domination was not deemed
adequate grounds for due process jurisdiction. But in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86
(1923) it was. See also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935) (perjury); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) (denial of counsel) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.
278 (1936) (third degree).
89. Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935) (systematic exclusion of Negroes
from grand juries by administrative officers); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600
(1935); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) (land ownership).
90. Compare Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910) with Power Mfg,
Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 (1927).
91. Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Gambino v. United States,
275 U. S. 310 (1927).
92. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937), overruling Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
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deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal
liberty." Even though this may seem to the dissenters an "overflow of
sentimentality", it counterbalances the natural tendency of the State and
its administrators to consider themselves above the law.
In labor relations the Court has displayed a progressive tendency to
sustain statutes which give advantages to the laborer in his dealing with
the employer. Many police power measures necessarily have as their
purpose the redress of a disequilibrium in the relations between persons
and groups by throwing the mantle of legal protection about those who
are handicapped. Notwithstanding the nineteenth century failure to appre-
ciate this necessity and its insistence on the freedom of contract as the
key to labor relations, the twentieth century, with minor exceptions, has
vitnessed a disposition to support enlargements of the laborer's privileges.
In recent years, when federal power has been so widely extended, this
tendency has been manifested even to the extent of broadening the inter-
pretation of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution." Federal
control is often justified because the various states cannot deal effectively
-ith a problem requiring uniform regulation, and on this justification
the Court is approving an expansion in the scope of the federal police
power and limiting private freedom of action. Thus the seminal phrase
"affecting commerce" among the states is the condition and authority for
the National Labor Relations Board to police labor relations in industry.
The broad interpretation accorded that phrase in supporting the control
of labor relations leads to the inference that it may not be long before
the production and distribution of raw materials and commodities which
are going to and have arrived from other states may likewise fall under
the federal police power." The general welfare clause, now to be given
its Hamiltonian construction, foreshadows a wide range of federal control
and operation of industry. 5
Again, we find the taxing power, both state and federal, increasingly
sustained as against a former tendency to construe it strictly." So the
sovereign halo which had protected the lessees of state lands and state
and federal employees and instrumentalities, even professors in state
93. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1
(1937); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 53 Sup. Ct.
656 (1938).
94. Possibly Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) has already been over-
ruled sub .ilentio, although the majority does not admit it.
95. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 641 (1937) (old-age benefits of Social Secur-
ity Act). Grant, Commerce, Production, and the Fiscal Powers of Congress (1936) 44
YALE L. J. 751, 991.
96. Compare Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930) and Baldwin v. Missouri,.
281 U. S. 586 (1930) with Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937).
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universities, from taxation by the other government, seems likely to
evaporate.9 7 In time, even Collector v. Day98 may be overruled.
Commentators upon the incidence of judicial control over legislation
are prone to conclude that the Supreme Court is infinitely more sensitive
to encroachments on property rights than on personal privileges." Pos-
sibly so, although in that clear antithesis the charge is hardly provable.
The fact may be due to economic determinism, to natural conservatism,
or to other causes. But in recent years wide extensions in the use of the
police and taxing power to accomplish business regulation have been sus-
tained. Discriminatory taxation based on size or number, as in the chain-
store cases, regulation to restrain natural economic advantages, such as
control of unfair or effective competition, even the suppression of un-
welcome industry, have met with little resistance from a majority of the
Supreme Court. The equalitarian philosophy of recent years has had
its effect, and courts generally have found it inadvisable to check it.
The constitutional limitations on federal power, the application of such
doctrines as the separation of powers, have enabled the Court to invalidate
certain New Deal legislation, like the NRA. But even here, nothing that
is considered to have a permanent value is likely to be stopped by any
opposition of the Supreme Court. The AAA is now with us in anothier
form and if by chance it should prove successful, the Supreme Court
will probably find it to be constitutional. The balance between private
freedom and the public control will continue to be maintained and the
line drawn where public opinion ultimately desires.
V.
Viewing the work of the Supreme Court in historical retrospect, it can
probably be said that it has performed its several functions more satis-
factorily than any other department of the Government. Especially for
a people like the American is a balance-wheel necessary, and that the
Supreme Court has supplied. Its mistakes as judged by the passage of
time have been relatively few. Hence the extreme desirability that it
should not expose itself to justifiable criticism in the performance of its
indispensable functions. It has erred in assuming the function of arbiter
of American social and economic policy and in using the due process
clause for that purpose. Had it refrained from this encroachment it
97. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937), Comment (1938) 51
HARv. L. Rav. 707; Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 58 Sup. Ct. 623 (1938),
overruling, and sustaining the minority, in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922)
and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393 (1932), (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV.
1105.
98. 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
99. Cf. Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control Over Congress (1937) 22
CORN. L. Q., 299.
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would probably have been spared the attacks of the past year and would
have obtained all the greater prestige for its strictly judicial work. In the
long run, also, the attempt to uphold certain types of private interest
against the Government's taxation and police power measures have not
strengthened those private rights, but have weakened them, for they have
become the object of attack in the political arena. Responsibility for the
ineptitude or unwisdom of legislation should be left with the legislatures.
The Supreme Court itself and the country will profit by a deflation
of the due process clause to normal proportions. A more natural inter-
pretation of the "privileges and immunities" clause would have avoided
the temptation to inflate the due process clause, and even now points
the way out."'0 "Due process" is so vague a term as necessarily to invite
challenge, when invoked by the Court as a ground for defeating legis-
lation. It obviously implies subjective criteria. Were the Court to build
a category of federal "privileges and immunities", it would find itself
on less vulnerable ground and the appeal would be to reason and not
verbiage. Not all the first eight amendments need be regarded as sacred
against state limitation. As indicated in the Palko case,1 ' the Court is
drawing a line between the fundamental and the merely procedural guar-
anties. Anything which would lift part of the load from the indefinable
"due process" platform and transfer it to the more comprehensible "priv-
ileges and. immunities" clause, might relieve the Court of some of the
current criticism.
The very magnitude of the power of passing on the constitutionality
of legislation carries with it great responsibility. The assumed detach-
ment of the Court from political strife, the obedience rendered to its
decrees, the sense of power which the finality of its fiat evokes, doubtless
led certain judges to assume the political unassailability of the Court.
They therefore, it is believed, abused a function which by its very po-
tentialities should have. been used sparingly and with restraint. The
failure to observe the limitations of power has ruined many a man and
institution. Had Napoleon resisted the temptation to try the winter sports
at Moscow, the history of Europe might have been quite different.
Justice Stone was correct, it is believed, when in his dissenting opinion
in the New York Minimum Wage case10 2 he said:
"It is difficult to imagine any grounds other than our own per-
sonal economic predilection for saying that the contract of employ-
ment is any the less a proper subject of legislation than are scores
of others in dealing with which this Court has held that legislatures
may curtail individual freedom in the public interest."
100. Cf. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
101. Supra note 75.
102. Morehead v. New York ex rtel. Tipaldo, 293 U. S. 587, 633 (1936).
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It was Justice Stone's dissent in the AAA case 0 3 to the effect that "the
only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-
restraint", that evoked Justice Sutherland's vigorous protest that such a
view was "ill-considered and mischievous". "Self-restraint," he says,
"belongs in the domain of will and not of judgment." But if the due
process decisions on substantive law prove anything, they demonstrate
that the Court's judgment is the product of the will. It is the social and
economic predilection which speaks. While the primacy of the public
welfare is gradually winning its way and the ever-growing complexity
of governmental regulation of business and other activities will probably
produce a tolerant attitude toward legislation, the life of the Court will
be prolonged by assuming the Holmesian attitude that it is not the Court's
function to censor the legislature's finding of an evil or the efficacy of
its remedies.
The events of recent years both in this country and abroad have indi-
cated that no institution is invulnerable. It would be a calamity of the
first order if the country should forfeit the stabilizing functions of the
Supreme Court by reason of an abuse of a function which it was not
intended by the due process clause that the Court should exercise. Toler-
ance of the encroachment is consistent only with a modest use of so vast
a power. Thus will the constant practice of running to the Court with
the claim of a violation of substantive due process be checked. Thus also
will legislatures be obliged to assume greater responsibility for the good
sense and the draftsmanship of their legislation and for its practical ef-
fectiveness. Thus also will a better governmental balance be restored.
The individual will then look to the right quarters for relief. The due
process protection of private property and even of civil liberties will
cease to be a transitory illusion and thus the sooner will the realities of
the balance between public and private interests be faced. From every
point of view, therefore, American institutions and the people will profit
from the relinquishment by the Supreme Court of its assumed function
as the arbiter of social policy.
103. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 79 (1936).
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